An Overview

THE #SHECURITY INDEX

Edition 2021

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Based on data collected in a joint effort
of European Parliament Research Service,
UN Women, NATO and others.

Access to full dataset here:
www.shecurity.info

1 FOREWORD

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Political decisions get better the more diverse the people are who make them. That is especially true in deeply divided societies, in countries that want to move from war to peace. Yet, women and marginalised groups are often absent from tables where key decisions are made. The same applies to our own EU and national institutions. Foreign and security policy often remains a closed circle of “people with badges talking to people with badges”. And the higher the level, the “harder” the security, the fewer women. This shouldn’t be news, but it is important to have data on the subject matter to push for real change. And that is why I set out, in 2020, to build the #SHEcurity Index; together with a growing team of supporting organisations and individuals.

This is the 2nd edition of the #SHEcurity Index. The index for the first time gave a comprehensive overview of how far we have come with regards to gender equality in Peace & Security and UN resolution 1325. This made an impact:

The index was widely reported upon, the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) community took note, state representatives got in touch, thanking us for the work that we do. Some of them were shocked to see how badly their country fares in contrast to others – and made vows to push for improvements.

On the European level, October last year saw the adoption of the European Parliament’s resolution on “Gender Equality in the EU’s foreign and security policy”, which calls on EU member states to adopt a Feminist Foreign Policy. Many of its ambitious demands were integrated into the third edition of the European Commission “Gender Action Plan”, valid until 2025, which serves as a framework for the EU’s approach to gender equality through external action. Examples are a goal of 85% of all new EU external action contributing to gender equality and a quota of 50% women for EU top management positions. In May this year, the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee adopted its opinion on the Gender Action Plan III, demanding i.a. specific and measurable indicators and targets for its implementation and an annual debate on this topic in the European Parliament.

But of course, #SHEcurity looks beyond the EU: Last year, we already included G20 countries – for the 2021 edition, countries with national action plans on the implementation of the WPS agenda were added. This broader scope allows for analyses that are even more detailed, and it makes the index relevant for a wider audience.

When reading the report, you will quickly notice another change. We now added the chapter #SHEcurity+, with sections on “Beyond women” and “Beyond representation”. The reason for this is simple: First of all, real diversity also means representation of marginalized groups and communities, such as People of Colour or members of the LGBTQI+ community, which we choose to look at this year. A black woman, for example, faces specific types of discrimination that a white woman will never be confronted with. Secondly, just “counting women” is not enough: We must examine the systemic, structural and social-cultural barriers that arise and more than often prevent meaningful participation – and find means to break these barriers.

Those who exclude women and marginalised groups and communities close the path to lasting peace. Foreign policy can only succeed, can only be sustainable, if they are represented, if their voices are being heard, if their experiences and priorities inform decisions.

The time for change is now.

Hannah Neumann

2 KEY FINDINGS

The #SHEcurity Index tracks the rate and progress of women's participation at all levels in foreign and security policy. It examines the developments over the past 21 years since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. Building on the first edition last year, we have expanded the scope of analysis for this year's Index. In addition to including new annual data, the database now contains 104 data sets: EU and G20 member states and the EU itself as included last year, plus all countries committed to the Women, Peace and Security agenda by releasing a national action plan.

This year, the #SHEcurity Index analyses the areas of politics, diplomacy, military, police, international missions and thinking security. The Index – again – identifies that the international community is far from achieving its commitments toward gender equality. Additionally, we have identified three overall trends:

(1) The most striking finding in last year's Index was the absence of data. This continues to be the biggest challenge, even though availability of data differs between the areas of analysis. The most severe data gaps are in diplomacy, military and police, and this overall lack of data is a finding in itself.

(2) The higher the seniority, prestige, and visibility, the lower the representation of women. An overall increase in participation is not accompanied by an increasing number of women in more senior positions.

(3) Women's representation differs depending on the area of analysis and changes in relation to the portfolios analysed. Their participation drops significantly when comparing general participation with the defence portfolio in parliaments, ministerial positions, or the military.

We have identified the following key findings across the six areas of analysis:

- **Politics:** Women's representation is increasing, albeit slowly, in national parliaments, and gender parity is still 37 years away. The only two countries that have achieved gender parity in parliament are the countries with a gender quota. Women's participation drops slightly looking at foreign affairs committees and decreases significantly, by 11 percentage points, comparing defence committees with parliaments as a whole. In 2020, there were fewer women defence (18,6%) than foreign ministers (24,3%) – a difference of 5,7 percentage points.

- **Diplomacy**: In 2020, only 25,5% of ambassadors were women even if diplomatic services (43,7%) and foreign ministry staff (47,6%) had almost achieved gender parity.

- **Military:** This area shows the lowest average of women's representation amongst all areas of analysis with only 11,4% in 2020 and still 155 estimated years until parity. However, the lack of data renders the estimates somewhat unreliable.

- **Police:** Women comprised 23,3% of police forces on overall average in 2020. This area of analysis presents a negative average annual increase. Based on this trend, estimated years cannot be calculated.

- **Civilian and military missions:** While gender parity in UN missions as a whole increased significantly in 2020 by 8 percentage points, to 48%, women's representation in EU CSDP missions was still at 24,3% on average, progressing slowly with a low average annual increase. At a leadership level, UN deputy heads of mission comprised 64% women in 2020, increasing 16 percentage points. Even if only 32% of women are serving as heads of mission, the UN is much closer to achieving gender parity than the EU. Looking at EU CSDP heads of mission, the share had dropped 11 percentage points in 2020 to 9,1% in 2020. Women's representation is lower in military and police missions for both UN and EU missions.

- **Thinking security:** The gender gap identified in the #SHEcurity Index so far also extends to the field of knowledge production between leadership and overall staff and between content and non-content staff. [1]

In addition to the numeric analysis, this year's Index includes a #SHEcurity+ section looking beyond the aspect of increasing women in numbers. #SHEcurity+ highlights the need to consider diverse and marginalised perspectives when shaping (foreign) policy, focusing this year on LGBTQI+ individuals and people of

colour. We examine factors that constitute meaningful participation, namely rights, resources, and socio-cultural practices.

Gender equality is at the core of peace and security. We have to start taking the gender representation gap seriously, or we will ultimately fail to build and strengthen peace, security, and development. We outline two aspects that will help achieve gender equality faster: First, acknowledging that implementing gender equality in foreign policy starts at home. Second, recognising that we have to look beyond states and strengthen civil society at home and abroad to make sure that we include the voices of those who, at least as of now, are not equally represented in the traditional institutions of peace and security.

The #SHEcurity Index intends to spark an important discourse on gender equality in peace and security. We encourage our readers to use the #SHEcurity Index as a tool and hope to encourage a lively debate to achieve actual and meaningful progress.

3 INTRODUCTION

The #SHEcurity Index takes stock of women's participation and representation in peace and security. It analyses their representation in (governmental) organisations and institutions shaping peace and security and tracks developments in numbers and pace. Gender equality is a strong indicator for peace and development, and the more diverse policymaking gets, the better the outcome.2 Foreign and security policymaking need to acknowledge not only the fundamental importance of gender but also the vast gender gap still prevalent. Gender equality and diversity are the foundations of international peace and security rather than simply an afterthought or an embellishment.3 Societies that discriminate and oppress women are less stable and more likely to be violent – internally and externally.4 This is why, 21 years ago, the UN Security Council unanimously acknowledged the role of gender equality in peace and security in the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and echoed its importance in its 9 subsequent resolutions, a framework known as the WPS agenda.[5]

Nevertheless, progress is slow, as last year's #SHEcurity Index illustrated.[6] Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has further exacerbated existing inequalities. The 2021 WEF Global Gender Gap Index indicates that the time to close the global gender gap has increased from 99,5 years to 135,6 years as a consequence of the pandemic.[7] Women and girls are disproportionally affected by the pandemic,[8] while once more, they are still not represented equally at the decision-making level. President Macrons "cabinet de guerre", comprising 2 women and 9 men, to combat the pandemic, is maybe the most emblematic example, but not the only one.[9] Women represent only 24% of 225 COVID-19 task forces at the global level and chair only 5% of these task forces.[10]

Looking at women's political representation overall, only 13 out of 193 countries have reached gender parity in national cabinets.[11] While the number of countries with women as heads of state or government has been increasing, there is also a rising number of countries where no women are represented as members of the cabinet at all.[12]

To shed better light on women's representation in peace and security around the globe, the #SHEcurity Index sets out to be even more comprehensive this year. We have expanded last year's database, updating numbers and addressing gaps where possible. The analysis now covers 104 data sets expanding its scope beyond EU and G20 member states and including all countries that have released a national action plan (NAP) on the implementation of the WPS agenda.[13] Additionally, this year's Index includes a #SHEcurity+ section because there is more to meaningful participation of women and marginalised groups in peace and security than increasing women's participation in numbers. With #SHEcurity+, we focus on the need to consider diverse experiences and marginalised perspectives when shaping (foreign) policy, such as LGBTQI+ individuals and people of colour (PoC). We examine the factors that constitute meaningful, equal, and fair participation: rights, resources, and socio-cultural practices.

The #SHEcurity Index serves as a useful tool and source for data on women's representation in peace and security. There is still a severe lack of comprehensive data on the actual status quo. Addressing this and compiling the available data in a single database, we intend to provide a clearer picture of where we stand. We want to encourage governments to improve data collection. We also hope to create a space for discussion bringing together the traditional security and defence community with those working on gender equality on a global scale. Gender equality affects and benefits all of us – we must engage everybody to achieve substantial progress.

4 METHODOLOGY

This year's #SHEcurity Index is based on a unique data set, including a total of 104 data sets, including 103 countries plus the EU as such. It focuses on key sectors in peace and security, namely politics, diplomacy, military, police, international missions, and thinking security.



Map by macrovector / Freepik

The #SHEcurity Index extrapolates a forecast of how many years it will take to reach full gender parity in a respective area of analysis – assuming developments continue at the same pace.[14] In cases where there is insufficient data available for past years to estimate the speed of progress, the analysis looks at the percentages of women's representation only.

4.1 SCOPE AND STRUCTURE

To render this edition of the #SHEcurity Index more comprehensive, we expanded its scope in two regards. First, the data from last year's edition has been updated with new data from 2020 and, in some cases, 2021. Where possible, we filled data gaps compared to last year's edition and refined data in select cases. Second, beyond EU/G20 member states, we have screened data for all countries that have released a NAP on the implementation of the WPS agenda.[15]

The #SHEcurity Index is again divided into six areas of analysis:

- **Politics:** % of women in European Parliament, national parliaments, national foreign and defence committees (if not unicameral then from lower chambers) and women serving as foreign and defence ministers

- **Diplomacy:** % of women serving as ambassadors, in the national diplomatic service, ministry of foreign affairs staff and the European External Action Service (EEAS)

- **Military:** % of women in national armed forces

- **Police:** % of women in national police forces

- **International missions:** % of women in UN peacekeeping missions, as head and deputy-heads of missions and in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions

- **Thinking security:** % of women's representation in the boards of EU and U.S. security and foreign policy think tanks[16]

To establish the #SHEcurity Index for a given area of analysis, available data is factored in equally, without weighting a region or country by size or other factors. For the EU/G20 member states that were already included in the Index last year, we added the data for 2020 and filled data gaps for previous years wherever possible, in each key area and respective sub-section. For the 60 newly added WPS NAP countries, we gathered annual data from 2000-2020/2021, again for each key area and respective sub-section.

4.2 DATA COLLECTION

This year's Index is the result of intense data collection over 24 months. Data has been provided by national and international authorities and in select cases by the European Parliament Research Service. We contacted all permanent representations and missions to the EU as well as local embassies in Belgium. Additionally, we reached out to national institutions, ministries of foreign affairs, ministries of defence, and various national security authorities. In those cases where data was difficult to access, we also reached

out to the EU delegations in respective countries. The European Parliamentary Research Service provided updated data on EU institutions, as well as in select cases for the EU and G20 countries. We complemented the database as far as possible through additional desk research, based on information publicly available, evaluating other existing indices, databases, platforms, and official online sources, such as national parliamentary webpages. Lastly, we reached out to international organisations and institutions such as NATO, UN Women, or the Inter-Parliamentary Union. External data is explicitly indicated and referenced throughout the Index.

In addition to including a broader selection of countries, we focused on including absolute numbers to showcase precise percentage points. In select cases, last year's Index data may have changed slightly by percentage points in this update.

However, 2020 was used as the main point of reference in data collection for this year's analysis. In the case of parliamentary committees, only 2021 data was accessible. This data might, however, is still subject to change and only represents a snapshot in time.

There are particular cases where countries do not have a certain position or institution. To distinguish them in the Index, those are marked with a dash (-). When no data was available or provided, the specific cell is left blank.

Considering that contact had already been established with several countries in the previous year's data collection, we have made two observations: (1) some embassies already started to collect data and knew how and where to easily request it from; (2) others failed to provide updates because data had not yet been collected due to various reasons (COVID-19, different priorities, lack of staff and time, unavailability/inaccessibility of data).

4.3 COMPARABILITY

This year's Index comprises a broader database, so we included several analytical clusters to facilitate better comparability. We calculated women's representation in each area and sub-section for each country individually as well as on average at the EU, G20, and regional levels. For the regional clusters, we are applying the same six regional groupings used by IPU's database Parline: Americas, Asia, Europe, Middle East and North Africa, Pacific, and Sub-Saharan Africa.[17] However, these regional averages represent only the average of those countries with a WPS NAP and should not be misinterpreted as the overall regional average. Averages are calculated as a sum of all data on women's representation of a given region and area of analysis. They do not represent averages of individual countries added up. Doing so, we have not distinguished overall added numbers by the size or other characteristics of the country of origin.

As per comparability between the #SHEcurity Indices 2020 and 2021, the indicators of women's representation in percentages per year, average increase per year, or estimated years until parity form a valid base for comparison looking at the country, the EU, and G20 level. Given the extension in the data set by including 60 additional countries, the total average per year calculated in this Index differs from the ones published with last year's Index based on G20 and EU member states only.

4.4 CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS

The biggest challenge continues to be a severe lack, non-availability or non-accessibility of data. Some areas of analysis continue to be better documented than others. Public accountability in the political realm might be a contributing factor. Data on political representation, for example, is in most cases easily accessible via public sources. Thus, we could rely on official public sources in cases where the institutions contacted did not provide data. Other areas, however, severely fail to document and/or provide data, particularly in the areas of diplomacy, military, and police. This limitation needs to be considered when looking at the tables and data of the #SHEcurity Index. This data gap creates further limitations in the use of the Index: regional averages are inconsistent or not as reliable where there are severe data gaps because the average calculation is based on data for only a few countries, in some cases even only one. We, therefore, refer to regional averages in the analysis only in cases where they are reliable and based on a larger database.

Beyond understanding and operationalising, the availability or lack of data can be seen as a result in itself. It shows a commit-

ment towards the implementation of gender equality or negligence thereof. To give an example: one EU country replied to our inquiry that women and men are equal before the law, and as such, there would be no need to collect gender-specific data. This neglects existing gender inequality on the grounds of technicalities. In select areas of analysis where a severe lack of data is the predominant finding, we have started to document the percentage of countries for which data is not provided, available or accessible, mainly in diplomacy, military and police. Over the next years, we will continue to gather information to complement the #SHEcurity database. We will also continue to identify gaps and shortcomings and share role model cases of those who progress towards and achieve gender parity over time. However, we do so to raise awareness and generate momentum for actual improvement. We would be delighted to highlight better documentation, an increase in the availability of data, accountability, and overall improvements in the next #SHEcurity Index. Some countries have already started to react to our inquiries can be interpreted as the first positive effect of the #SHEcurity Index itself.

Overall, a lack of transparent and comparable data and databases for gender-equal participation in peace and security has been mirrored in our conversations with other experts in the course of drafting this year's analysis. There is no standard international documentation or evaluation scheme on the issue, and this is all the more reason to refine the #SHEcurity Index. Our ambition is to have a #SHEcurity Index, which allows for real comparability. Doing so, we also rely on your cooperation and kindly ask you to contact the #SHEcurity team if you know or have access to additional data. This way, we can continue to build an ever more comprehensive data set together for our mutual benefit.

5 #SHECURITY 2021

This year's database includes 104 data sets and provides insights into women's representation in peace and security globally. The following section highlights the most prominent trends and best and worst cases at the country and the regional level. At the same time, the data merits more in-depth analyses, and we understand the following analysis as a starting point to spark debate.

5.1 POLITICS

5.1.1 PARLIAMENTS

Last year's #SHEcurity Index documented an increase in women's political representation since 2000. This year's Index shows a continuation of this trend, albeit slowly and not without backslides. On average, we are still 37 years away from gender parity in national parliaments.



With still 27 estimated years to go, the region closest to achieving gender parity is the Americas (28% in 2020). Interestingly, looking at Europe (29,6% in 2020) or EU member states alone, the average share of women's representation is slightly higher (30,5% in 2020).



However, because of a slow average increase per year, the EU average is lagging with still 35 years until parity. Zooming in, the European Parliament is performing better (39,5% in 2020) and is ten years ahead of EU member states, with an estimated 25 years until parity. With 45 estimated years until gender parity, the Pacific region shows the slowest average increase (28,4% in 2020), while the lowest percentage of women's representation on regional average is in the Middle East and North Africa with 19,7%. Though notably, together with the Americas, these regions have the highest average increase per year.

At the individual country level, only two countries have reached – and in one case overachieved – gender parity since 2008, namely Rwanda with a share of 61,3%, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with 50% women in parliament. Both countries have legislated gender quotas.[18]

Those countries closest to parity based on the estimated years are, in order, Mexico (48,2%), New Zealand (48,3%), South Africa (46,8%), Senegal (43%), and Serbia (38,8%).

At the other end of the spectrum, the 5 countries with the longest estimated years until parity in parliaments are Afghanistan, Burkina Faso (6,3% in 2020), the Netherlands (33,3% in 2020), Yemen (0,3% in 2020), and Germany (31,2% in 2020). Due to negative trends in the first 4 cases, estimated years until parity can only be calculated for Germany with 1645 years.[19]

Focusing on women's representation in 2020, there are 8 countries with a share of women in parliament below 10%: Yemen (0,3%), Lebanon (4,7%), Burkina Faso (6,3%), Solomon Islands (6,4%), Nigeria (7,2%), Central African Republic (8,6%), Gambia (8,6%), and Japan (9,9%).

5.1.2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE COMMITTEES

Looking at foreign and defence policy, we focused more closely on the competent committees in national parliaments. In cases where insufficient data is available between 2000 and 2020, the Index looks into 2021 alone. Accordingly, there are only numbers/percentages for such years and no pace of progress calculated. Still, even this momentary snapshot highlights interesting findings.

Comparing foreign affairs committees and national parliaments as a whole, women's representation does not differ significantly on average. The average value is even 1,7 percentage points higher in foreign affairs committees with 28,3%. But regional averages vary significantly, between minus 1 percentage point or plus 10 percentage points. The Pacific region shows the highest

share of women in foreign affairs committees, namely 38,9%, which is 10 percentage points higher than the regional average in parliaments as a whole. With 10% women in foreign affairs committees across the region, the Middle East and North Africa shows the lowest regional average and a difference of minus 10 percentage points compared to parliaments as a whole.

% OF WOMEN IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEES OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS (TOP 10 AND BOTTOM 10 COUNTRIES)*

*amongst countries which responded



When looking at national data, 7 countries have (over)achieved gender parity in foreign affairs committees: Mexico (69,7%), New Zealand (66,7%), North Macedonia (64,3%), Ukraine (57,1%), Iceland (55,6%), Australia (50%), Rwanda (50%).[20] There are also 4 countries without a single woman in their foreign affairs committee: Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Malta, and the Solomon Islands. In summary, while we can observe differences between foreign affairs committees and parliaments as a whole, there are 4 countries[21] with no women at all represented in foreign affairs committees and 7 countries[22] that (over)achieve gender parity. There is no distinct trend visible.

This changes, however, when comparing defence committees across parliaments. On average, women make up only 16% of defence committees, 10,6 percentage points less than when looking at parliaments as a whole. The biggest discrepancy is between overall women's representation in parliament and representation on defence committees in the Pacific region, where women are not represented at all (minus approximately 28 percentage points in comparison). This is also the case in the Middle East and North Africa region (minus approximately 20 percentage points in comparison). The only region where the difference is less than 10 percentage points is Sub-Sahara Africa, where defence committees comprise, on average, 19,5% women, approximately 5 percentage points less than in parliament as a whole. It is also the highest regional average on defence committees compared to the other regional and EU averages. At the country level, only Latvia has over-achieved gender parity in its defence committee, in which women represent 57,1%.

Since analysing overall numeric representation does not provide more detailed information about women`s positioning in decision-making hierarchies, this year's Index additionally screened women's representation as committee chairs for both foreign affairs and defence committees.

On foreign affairs committees, only 13 out of 104 data sets, 17.6% on average, are chaired by a woman. The European Parliament has never had a woman chair the foreign affairs committee. In comparison, the EU Parliaments defence committee has been chaired by a woman since 2014. Overall, 12,2% of defence committees are chaired by women, 10 out of 104. Only in Switzerland and Uganda both committees are chaired by women. These observations point to a trend identified in all areas of analysis that provide insight into hierarchies: the #SHEcurity Index points out that overall numeric representation does not lead to the same share of women in leadership positions. In some cases, it suggests an indirect relation between the level of decision-making

and the presence of women. The higher the decision-making level, the fewer women present (see sections on diplomacy, international missions and thinking security). Women climb up the ladder, but a glass ceiling remains firmly in place. However, there are exceptions in which women chair a committee even though their ratio in the committee is low.[23] We point to these cases, to be precise, but they do not dismantle the overall trend.

5.1.3 FOREIGN MINISTERS

When we look at the positions of foreign and defence ministers, we can see similar trends as with foreign and defence committees when considering the average of all countries included.

We are still 40,8 estimated years away from achieving gender parity amongst foreign ministers on the overall average. In 2020, only 24,3% of all countries in the Index had a woman as foreign minister, making 25 out of 103 countries in absolute numbers. In comparison, 36 countries have never had a woman foreign minister. Looking back to 2000, only 12 countries, 11,7%, had a woman serving as foreign minister. While there is a noticeable improvement, progress is still disappointing, considering that twenty years have passed. Notably, South Africa has had only women serving as foreign ministers since 2000. On regional average, the Pacific region has over-achieved gender parity with 66,7%.

Sub-Saharan Africa is closest to achieving parity next, with only 6,3 years missing and 40,7% women as foreign ministers in 2020. However, the outlook on the other regional averages is less positive. Aside from the Middle East and North Africa not having had a single woman as foreign minister in the last 20 years, other regions are progressing very slowly or even backwards. Europe, for example, has one of the slowest increases on average and still needs an estimated 93,3 years to achieve parity. Closing in at EU member states only, the Index cannot provide several estimated years until parity because there is zero average increase per year. We can even observe a negative trend of -1,1% on average per year for the Americas region.

In 2014, Sweden declared to have the first feminist government in the world.[24] Since then, several countries have reported pursuing – overall or partly – feminist foreign policies.[25] Looking at the developments in Sweden since this declaration, it seems the country has taken its commitment seriously as it has had women as foreign minister for the last 7 years, following a long period of men holding the position.[26] In the case of the other countries following Sweden's aspirations, it is relatively soon to tell. However, notably, France has had only one in the last 20 years, and Luxemburg has not a single woman as foreign minister. Considering political pledges, the political will to change would need to increase significantly to overcome this implementation gap.

5.1.4 DEFENCE MINISTERS

Similar to the committees, we can observe a further decrease in women's representation comparing foreign with defence portfolios. But comparing the average increase per year, we are closer to achieving gender parity amongst defence than foreign ministers.

On average, of all 103 countries analysed, only 19 had a woman as defence minister in 2020, constituting 18,6%. Based on the average increase per year, we are still 37,6 years away from gender parity. There are 60 countries, who have never had a woman defence minister at all in the last 20 years. Only three countries have (over)achieved gender parity amongst defence ministers in the previous 20 years: Bangladesh, Norway and South Africa.
Looking closer, the Americas region even shows 0% of women as defence ministers.

We cannot calculate estimated years until parity for the two regions Americas and Asia (8,3%) due to zero average increase per year. On the other hand, the Pacific region shows the highest regional average with 33,3% and is closest to achieving parity with ten years missing. Following behind is Europe, with 22 estimated years missing (25% in 2020). In this case, EU member states alone are looking even better with 18,6 years missing and 25,9% women's representation in 2020.

At the individual level, it is interesting to compare these trends to the performance of those countries with a feminist foreign policy. Canada, Luxembourg, Mexico have never had a woman as defence minister in the last 20 years. Sweden has only partly a women defence minister in 2014 but not ever since. Spain and France, on the contrary, have achieved gender parity for this period.

5.2 DIPLOMACY

In the realm of diplomacy, #SHEcurity 2021 distinguishes between ambassadors, diplomatic service, and foreign affairs ministry staff (MFA staff) as of this year. During data collection, we have identified that countries included in the Index do not apply a coherent understanding of these categories. The lack of consistent and clear documentation makes it harder to gain a consistent picture of women's representation in the realm of diplomacy. MFA staff in this Index refers to everybody employed by a ministry of foreign affairs, at the global level and home, including technical and administrative staff. Diplomatic service specifies diplomatic and consular personnel representing the home government abroad.

The #SHEcurity analysis on diplomacy, looking at EEAS, ambassadors, diplomatic service, and MFA staff, illustrates the lack of gendered data. The data in this area of analysis is the most incomplete in this database, and a #SHEcurity Index, in the sense of estimated years until parity, could only be calculated in few cases. Conclusions on the overall average are not as comprehensive and substantial. Even though this makes it difficult to draw any larger conclusions, the lack of data is a result in itself. To monitor commitments and progress toward gender equality, it should be in every country's interest to improve significantly.

5.2.1 AMBASSADORS

Comparing the data on ambassadors with MFA staff and diplomatic service gives an insight into the disparities between the overall representation of women and their access to higher-ranking positions.

Even though the availability of data on ambassadors is very limited, we can see that only about a quarter of ambassador posts are staffed with women. At the same time, the average percentage of women's representation amongst MFA staff for all countries is 47,6% and 43,7% for diplomatic service in 2020. The more visible and prestigious the position, the fewer the number of women present.

On overall average, the estimated years until gender parity amongst ambassadors amount to 30 years. This positive outlook is dimmed, however, as the scarcity of data limits the significance of this conclusion. Looking at the findings in more detail, consistent data over the last 20 years is available for only eight countries.[27]

% OF WOMEN AMBASSADORS
(TOP 10 AND BOTTOM 10 COUNTRIES)*

*amongst countries which responded, as of 2020



In 2020, data was provided or accessible for only 36 of the data sets analysed. This makes it somewhat difficult to draw meaningful conclusions on overall or regional averages.[28] Of those 36 data sets where data is available for 2020, women hold 25,5% of ambassador posts, actually decreasing 0,8 percentage points compared to 2019. Based on the data available, we can only depict a somewhat average situation in EU countries in 2020 where 26,3% of ambassadors are women. In both cases, a decrease compared to last year could be because countries with

higher rates of women's representation, such as Australia, Estonia, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, did not provide data for 2020. Comparing women's representation at the country level shows large discrepancies in performance. However, not a single country has reached parity amongst ambassadors. Finland comes closest with 47,6%, followed by Austria with 45,2% and Latvia with 39,5%. At the opposite end, Belgium scores lowest with 11%, followed by Kyrgyzstan (13%), Nepal, and Chile (both 14%). Looking solely at the EU member states does not offer a better outlook, and 13 member states have a share of women's representation below 30%, and 7 EU member states did not provide data in 2020. The EU (meaning EEAS) is performing better with 31,7% women's representation, increasing 5 percentage points compared with last year. The very different scores amongst EU member states and the EU itself is a good indication to increase the exchange of best practices and learn from each other – considering gender equality is a key commitment of the European Union.

5.2.2 DIPLOMATIC SERVICE & MFA STAFF

On diplomatic service and MFA staff, the database is even slimmer than on ambassadors. On diplomatic service, data is available only for 13 data sets included in the Index, and on MFA staff, only for 26 of the countries. Notably, the data provided sheds a relatively positive light on women's representation in diplomatic service and MFA staff as a whole. In their diplomatic service, three countries have (over)achieved gender parity: Bosnia Herzegovina (54,0%), Croatia (55,8%), and Latvia (53,2%). Analysing MFA staff, it is even 10 countries that have done so. Considering the limited number of countries for which data is available, it would be interesting to know whether those countries not documenting data are performing equally well and how the average might change with a more extensive database available.

% OF WOMEN IN THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE*

*amongst countries which responded



5.2.3 EEAS

Looking at EEAS in an exemplary manner, we can also observe the trend that overall representation is not the same as access to more senior-level positions. EEAS overall staff in 2020 comprises 48,7% women, whilst only 32% of EU ambassadors were women. Zooming in more closely, we continue to observe a trend that the higher the rank, the lower the percentage of women within EEAS organisational structures. While women represent 65,4% at the assistant level, only 37,3% are present at the managerial level. However, numbers at the management level have increased by 2,4 percentage points from 2019 to 2020. Taking EU Special Representatives (EUSR) as an example, there are currently three women and six men holding the position of EUSR.[29]

5.2.4 SELECT CASES IN POINT: DISARMAMENT AND CLIMATE DIPLOMACY

The observations made by this Index are backed up by research on diplomacy and gender. Studies suggest that diplomatic fields are still dominated by gender stereotypes. This means that men are over-represented in so-called 'hard security' profiles such as disarmament, and women are underrepresented in those appointments regarded as more prestigious.[30]

As an example in the area of diplomacy, we want to highlight a UN Institute on Disarmament Research study on gender balance in disarmament diplomacy conducted in 2019.[31] It points to the marginalisation of women in multilateral disarmament meetings, where women only comprise 32% of participants in meetings with over 100 participants: in smaller meetings, only 20% on average. Again, it is important to look at participation patterns in more detail, as the representation of women declines with the increasing importance of positions in a delegation or committees. Astonishingly, while women's numeric representation in the sphere of disarmament diplomacy has increased, their role has not progressed at the same pace.

Another example is climate diplomacy: a 2020 UN report on the gender composition of UN efforts and instruments under the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement conclude that party delegations have been comprised of 40% of women in comparison to only 27% women being heads of delegation. Compared to the previous annual reporting, while the number of women's participation in delegation shows a 2% increase, the number of women being heads of delegation did not change.[32] This supports the same observation made above in the Index on a very stable and intact glass ceiling.

5.3 MILITARY

Even though availability of data is better than in the realm of diplomacy, the area of the military is also challenged by a lack of transparent, accessible data. The period analysed continues to be limited starting in 2009, as in last year's Index. Thanks to data collected by NATO and select embassies, data on 2020 is available on 36 countries.[33]

Comparing the average rate of women's representation across all areas of analysis, the ratio of women's representation in the military is lowest at 11,4% in 2020, and estimated years until parity amount to 155 years. The scarcity of data does not allow the calculation of meaningful regional averages. To get a better point of reference, NATO's diligent documentation of member states' data allows for some comparison. In 2019, the NATO member nations' full-time military comprised 12% women on average.[34]

WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION IN NATIONAL MILITARY



Looking at the individual country level in 2020, there are 15 countries in which women's representation in the military is below 10%. Of those 15, 13 are European. Considering an EU average of 10,7% women's representation, it is not surprising that not one EU member state reaches a share of women's representation higher than 16,8%, which is the case in Bulgaria. The highest share of women in the military in 2020 is reached by Bangladesh with 20% and the Republic of Moldova with 21,2%, which on the other hand has an estimated 1584 years until parity due to a very low average increase. This points to the fact that data is inconsistent, and the only overall trend we can identify is the overall low representation.

During data collection, we identified a difficulty due to very different forms of defining and calculating military personnel. There has not been a single standardised category of data provided, considering the diverse divisions or rankings. Therefore, we stick only to one indicator: the overall number of women in the national military. In select cases, differing numbers have been provided for the same year and country by NATO and respective embassies. To maintain consistency and comparability of data, we have chosen the information provided by NATO in these cases. Regardless, sources are indicated in the Index.

A more in-depth analysis of military data should not overlook structural barriers that might be in place, limiting women's access to military units or promotion. Such factors surely have an additional impact on overall representation.

% OF WOMEN IN NATIONAL ARMED FORCES*
*amongst countries which responded



5.4 POLICE

Similar to the previous areas of analysis, data on police forces is available only to a limited extent, concretely only for 48 countries. It is, however, sufficient to provide an overall picture. Even though progress has been slow, the upward trend in women's participation in police forces continues. In 2020, there is an overall average of 23,3% of women's representation in police forces. Due to a small negative average increase per year, estimated years until parity cannot be calculated for police forces on average.

% OF WOMEN IN NATIONAL POLICE FORCES*
*amongst countries which responded



Not one country has achieved gender parity as of now. The 3 countries closest to achieving gender parity, based on the estimated years, are Hungary (7), Belgium (9), Lithuania (9), Norway (9). The furthest, based on estimated years, are Czech Republic (160), Luxembourg (178), and Portugal (184), Turkey (245), Serbia (374), Greece (650), Netherlands (696), Chile (967), and Poland (2469).

5.5 INTERNATIONAL MISSIONS

Two trends that we identified in previous areas of the Index can also be found in the data on international missions. First, an increase in numeric representation does not automatically lead to higher numbers of women in decision-making. Second, police and military missions continue to show similarly low shares of women's representation than national military and police forces. These trends can be observed both in UN and EU international missions.

5.5.1 UN PEACEKEEPING

Overall, UN missions have steadily progressed toward equal participation of women. On average, the total staff in UN missions has continuously increased over the past years and has risen eight percentage points compared to 2019, to 48% in 2020. The #SHEcurity Index predicts only 1 estimated year to achieve gender parity.

Looking at the data more in-depth, the number of deputy heads of mission has actually over-achieved gender parity with 64% in 2020, an increase of 16 percentage points compared to last year. However, only 32% of women are represented as heads of mission. At the same time, the 2,29% average increase per year allows an estimated time of only 8 years to achieve gender parity at the highest decision-making level. If UN missions continue at this pace, this is a laudable development. The same cannot be said on police and military missions.

Police officers in UN missions comprise only 17,6% of women, and it will take an estimated 39 years until parity. Military officers only include 5,8% of women, and the estimated time to reach gender parity amounts to 139 years.

WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION IN UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS



5.5.2 EU CSDP MISSIONS

The Index does not reveal positive developments on EU CSDP missions. Women's representation in EU missions is overall significantly lower than in UN Peacekeeping. The total international staff of EU civilian missions includes a mere 24,3% women in 2020, and the Index provides an estimate of 31 years until gender parity. Analysing contracted and seconded staff both in more detail, the Index points out a very stable level of approximately a quarter of the mission staff being women over the last five years.

Looking at heads of missions, the percentage of women has even dropped 11 percentage points compared to 2019 to 9,1% women as heads of mission. Based upon these trends, this provides an estimate calculation of 59 years until gender parity will be achieved amongst heads of EU CSCP missions.

To some extent, the EU has shown awareness of the need to increase women's representation amongst all ranks of civilian CSDP missions in the 2019 joint action plan for the implementation of the Civilian CDSP Compact by the EEAS and the European Commission. Some of the actions taken can be seen as

positive developments to counter the low representation of women in CSDP missions.

However, the joint action plan has partly diverted responsibility to increase women's representation to member states. Very few member states, however, specify concretely how to increase women's participation.[35]

Just as the general trend of women's representation in the military sphere suggests, women's representation drops considerably in the case of EU military CSDP missions.

Comprehensive gender-disaggregated data on EU military missions is available only starting in 2017. With numbers changing slightly depending on missions, women's representation varies between 3% in EUFOR ALTHEA and 11% in EUNAVFOR MED IRINI in 2020.

Non-executive missions on average comprise 5,1%, executive operations on average 6,4% of women's representation in 2020: analysing trends, the Index points to a slightly negative average increase for both non-executive and executive missions. Estimated years until gender parity amount to 115 years for non-executive and 90 years for executive missions. The bitter constant





is the 0% heads of missions since the start of data recording in 2015. Not one military mission is headed by a woman.

5.6 THINKING SECURITY

Though not directly part of decision-making, think tanks working on peace and security and greatly shape the political debate. Given their important role in international peace and security, this year's #SHEcurity Index briefly looks at gender equality in the sphere of "Thinking security". The gender gap identified in the #SHEcurity Index so far also extends to the field of knowledge production. The German Marshall Fund (GMF) and the 2020 Gender Scorecard by Women in International Security (WIIS), analysing European and U.S.-based think tanks, respectively, identified a steep gap in gender-equal representation between leadership and overall as well as between content and non-content staff. The GMF analysis points to women only constituting 23% of the Boards of European Think Tanks, with men making up 77%. The WIIS Gender Scorecard 2020 paints a similar picture for U.S.-based think tanks with 25% women and 75% men in Think Tank Governing Boards.[36] At the same time, the gender ratio amongst non-senior content staff looks much better, with 48% of European think tank experts being women. To achieve

gender equality at the senior level, these numbers have to be translated into management positions in the coming years.

We realise that this offers a western-centric picture and disregards the existing variety in the international think tank landscape. We believe, however, that there is a value-added in exemplifying the gender gap in knowledge production, despite its limitations. Northern institutions shape the global discourse on foreign and security policy heavily due to their privileged and predominant positions. Even if not quantitatively analysed, there is also an increasing debate about gender ratio in the think tank landscape globally. [37]

6 #SHECURITY+

The #SHEcurity Index analyses women's participation in peace and security in an easily quantifiable way: counting women's representation in (governmental) organisations and institutions shaping peace and security. By using sex as a social signifier, our methodology falls short in two regards: (1) taking into account the underrepresentation of other marginalised groups; (2) discussing barriers for true, fair, and equal participation such as rights, resources, and social practices. Numerical analysis is an important tool to track gender equality, but an increase in numbers does not automatically translate to equal distribution of power. Key to sustainable security is taking into account our complex realities and diverse perspectives. Any approach to security needs to be based on intersectionality to acknowledge that different forms of discrimination and exclusion - such as sexism, racism, classism, ableism, and nationalism - can compound one another.[38] That is why this year's #SHEcurity Index includes this #SHEcurity+ section. It addresses the need to go beyond the focus on women and representation to achieve inclusive, diverse, and, therefore, better policymaking.[39] True diversity is not about counting women – it is about making women count![40]

6.1 BEYOND "WOMEN" [41]

The WPS agenda is the core political framework of gender equality in peace and security. It calls for equal participation and representation of women and acknowledges their role as an important dimension in peace and security.[42] In its current form, however, the WPS agenda lacks an intersectional perspective. As a result, it disregards the specific needs and perspectives of persons that fall in the WPS remit but experience intersecting forms of discrimination, such as LGBTQI+ persons or women of colour (WoC).[43] It also reduces the 'gender' aspect to a women's issue. Gender means much more: it describes socially constructed behaviours, attributes, expressions, and roles that a given society considers appropriate and expects from an individual – based on their assigned sex.[44] If we fail to include such diverse perspectives, we fail to use the peacebuilding potential that comes with more comprehensive and diverse approaches.

> Putting it bluntly, an approach to gender equality lifting white, upper-class, heterosexual women from the global north alone will not transcend into the more diverse policymaking that the WPS agenda aspires for.

This year's #SHEcurity+ chapter will focus on the perspectives of LGBTQI+ individuals and people of colour (PoC) as two distinct aspects of identity.[45] We discuss their experiences and contribution to peace and how they have been marginalised in international security.

6.1.1 INTEGRATING LGBTQI+ VOICES AND PERSPECTIVES IN PEACE AND SECURITY

Conflating 'gender' and 'women' structures society in a system of only two socially acceptable forms of identity, women and men, assuming seemingly obvious biological differences are easily attributable. This is known as a binary understanding of gender and it excludes the perspectives of those who do not conform to gender stereotypes or who do not identify themselves with either one of these binary ascriptions.[46] Applying an intersectional perspective, we have to unpack LGBTQI+ as one homogenous community and acknowledge the multiple identities its members hold. For example, a lesbian whose gender identity and expression align with societal gender stereotypes of femininity is affected differently than a transgender person. Foreign and security policy institutions and policymaking have so far largely neglected this, and so has the WPS agenda.

The WPS is based on a narrow understanding of gender and lacks a nuanced conceptualisation of gender and sexual identities – even 21 years into its making.[47] It does not mention LGBTQI+ individuals and their experiences and fails to address the diversity that gender identities represent.[48] At the same time, LGBTQI+ individuals are disproportionately affected in conflict settings and specifically targeted in many cases because they transgress social norms by their very existence.[49] If we want to change that, we need to better understand what security looks like from diverse LGBTQI+ perspectives.[50]

Discrimination based on sexual orientation and/or gender identity is legally banned in only 76 countries, with 103 countries offering no legal protection against discrimination. In 69 countries, homosexuality continues to be illegal, even punishable by death in 5.[51] Moreover, discriminatory legislation still inhibits equal opportunity and participation in peace and security. For example, 26 countries prohibit LGBTQI+ individuals from serving in the military.[52] In addition, there is little awareness of the experiences and needs of LGBTQI+ individuals within security forces.



Data: Equaldex, https://www.equaldex.com/issue/military

LGBTQI+ individuals who are publicly visible through their participation in policymaking are often facing threats to their physical and mental wellbeing, even their existential safety, limiting their representation even further. In settings of conflict or instability, this insecurity is aggravated. Informal support networks, traditionally available in these settings, are often based on social cohesion, relying on community or family structures. These, however, are often inaccessible to marginalised individuals, such as LGBTQI+ people who are often disowned by or excluded from these structures.[53]

In such contexts, emergency shelters, such as refugee camps, are often the last resort, and homelessness is a lingering threat. At the same time, emergency shelters are mostly built to address the needs of families, which are defined as mothers, fathers, and children, failing many LGBTQI+ individuals. This can hinder LGBTQI+ people from accessing basic need structures, such as food, water, sanitary, hygiene, or cash handouts. In some cases, homosexual partners are not recognised as the person entitled to access the food ration. In other cases, their physical appearance does not match the identity indicated on the identification document.[54] Additionally, emergency shelters often fail to provide safe spaces to LGBTQI+ individuals. Yet safe spaces are particularly important in settings that offer no privacy, exposing people in their sexual or gender identity, which increases the risk of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV). SGBV during conflict affects women but also specifically targets LGBTQI+ individuals on a large scale.[55] Research by the non-governmental organisation Colombia Diversa identifies the scale of SGBV committed against LGBTQI+ people during the Colombian armed conflict and highlights that it is rooted in deeply engrained discriminatory socio-cultural patterns.[56] SGBV against LGBTQI+ individuals is known to have been used as a weapon of war by all parties. The phenomenon is not limited to the case of Colombia but has, for example, also been reported in the case of ISIS rule in Northern Iraq. The aim is to maintain the oppressive social order built upon gender inequality and stereotypical gender roles.

LGBTQI+ survivors of SGBV experience even less protection or accountability due to the social stigma, increased discrimination, or even criminalisation they are confronted with. The lack of protective laws and weak law enforcement can affect the success of sustainable conflict resolution and transitional justice processes.[57] There is too little acknowledgement and documentation of SGBV against LGBTQI+ persons in settings of conflict and instability. If crimes are not documented and addressed, we not only fail to provide security to those survivors. Research increasingly indicates that gender equality at the domestic level is a strong indicator for peaceful external relations.[58] Additionally, survivors might fear for their safety by addressing traditional se-

curity providers. Actors like the police can be sources of insecurity to LGBTQI+ individuals, particularly in contexts of social stigma, discriminatory laws or criminalisation. Research by Front Line Defenders on the situation of human rights defenders (HRD) protecting the rights of LGBTQI+ individuals and sex workers reveals that physical attacks, sexual assault and harassment by security forces against HRD have increased sharply during COVID-19.[59] [60] International pandemic relief has mostly failed to take this into account.

LGBTQI+ individuals, including anybody who challenges a binary, heteronormative understanding of gender, are challenging social norms by their very existence. They face stigma and discrimination as long as our societies, organisations and institutions continue to reproduce gender inequalities and the status quo.[61] This is why they should form (a visible) part of any discourse on gender equality, which in many cases they are not.[62] Some small steps have been taken in this direction.[63]

> The improvements that we have reached for women based on a better understanding of their specific needs have not been reached or even addressed for LGBTQI+ individuals.

We need to urgently integrate LGBTQI+ perspectives in all dimensions of the WPS agenda, starting with the use of inclusive language and incorporating them into analysis, planning, programming, and budgeting.[64] Only in doing so can we realise both securing LGBTQI+ rights and using the potential that diverse and inclusive foreign policymaking offers more sustainable security for everybody.

We have highlighted an enormous data gap on LGBTQI+ experiences in peace and security. Yet, it would be difficult and even problematic to quantify numeric representation. However, carefully refraining from collecting, and therefore potentially singling out, quantifiable data on LGBTQI+ participation in an exposing way is no excuse to keep us from addressing their needs and ensuring their representation. If at all, the question of how and to what extent quantifiable data should be collected needs to be guided by the question whose strategic objective this benefits – with the protection of vulnerable groups and individuals as first priority and in close consultation with them.

6.1.2 WOMEN[65] OF COLOUR IN PEACE AND SECURITY

So far, we have stressed that political decisions get better the more diverse the people involved in it. This is true for peace and security, especially when we talk about deeply divided societies. UN Secretary-General António Guterres points to “colonialism and patriarchy” as “two of the historic sources of inequality in our world” and debunks the image of “a post-racist world” as a “delusion”.66 We have to decode what this means for international peace and security. Institutionalised racism results in the marginalisation of PoC, particularly WoC, in peace and security in three ways: (1) The disproportionate underrepresentation of WoC; (2) An understanding of security not accounting for the experiences of WoC; (3) Global governance dominated by global north perspectives. As WoC are not fully represented in the institutions that shape peace and security, neither are their experiences. We need to rethink security in a way that fully incorporates them.

(1) Underrepresentation of WoC individuals in numbers
It is difficult to provide concrete numbers for the underrepresentation of WoC in international affairs. The lack of consistent data gathering has been challenging for #SHEcurity overall, and a lack of intersectional analyses exacerbates this in the case of WoC. There are, however, indicators pointing to a larger picture of marginalisation. First of all, there are WoC who continuously share their experiences.[67] We need to take their voices seriously. Secondly, looking at specific countries’ data as available exemplifies the situation. In 2019, only about 25% of foreign service specialists and approximately 18% of foreign service generalist staff of the U.S. foreign service workforce were PoC,[68] whereas PoC represented 34% of the general U.S. workforce.[69] Additionally, promotion rates were lower for PoC than white colleagues with equal qualifications.[70] Within security forces, the military, in particular, WoC, are often low ranking and commonly assigned to career fields such as administration and logistics. In the U.S., for example, racial diversity is less prevalent in senior ranks where key decisions are made. Senior officers are disproportionately white and male.[71]

Another example is the exclusion of WoC in the climate justice discourse. WoC are disproportionally affected by the impacts of climate change, but they are less present in climate diplomacy.[72]

(2) An understanding of security not accounting for the experiences of WoC
Structural racism is a global phenomenon that originates at the domestic level and projects into foreign policy.[73] Breaking these patterns means addressing the root causes of inequality at home. However, most WPS NAPs are outward-looking, as if inequalities and exclusion that impact gender, peace and security were only happening elsewhere.[74] Rethinking security requires us to acknowledge that the realities for PoC are affected by personal experiences of traditional security providers failing to provide safety and security – often at home.

At the global level and particularly in the U.S., the discourse has been shaken up by the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement and the killing of the Black U.S. citizen George Floyd by a white police officer in May 2020. Racist discrimination might be most visible in the brutal form of police violence, but it perpetuates in all security matters – economic, social, health, and political.[75] For example, in the case of COVID-19 mortality, research suggests that, in the U.S., the death toll amongst Black women is more than 3 times higher than white or Asian men. This fact has been disregarded so far due to the hypothesis of men being affected more strongly than women.[76] This highlights that we need intersectional analyses and disaggregated data to address blind spots and racist patterns in our policies and identify specific needs. Concretely, such analysis looks at a given issue from a race and gender perspective – and combines these two dimensions. Intersectional security analyses serve as a tool to identify specific needs and tailor policies that addresses them, and they are essential for security at the individual and international levels.

Racial and gendered patterns in cyber security are just one case in point. Due to racial and gender bias in software development, facial recognition software often fails to correctly identify PoC. An analysis by U.S. Customs and Border Protection concludes that the highest rates of false-positive notifications affect Black women. This can cause false accusations and repercussions at the personal level and fails the purpose of security provision against threats.[77] There are countless similar examples, but most importantly, we need to understand and address the intrinsic racism within our societies on a structural level to stop reproducing patterns of inequality on a global scale.

As such, we need to acknowledge WoC as agents. Instead of portraying WoC as victims on the covers of NAPs developed by white decision-makers,[78] we also need to increase the visibility of WoC on conference stages and in situation rooms. This is true not only for policymaking but also in academia. Faculty, course syllabi, and academic discourse of international relations are dominated by white, western perspectives and actors. Yet, the role of research and academia is crucial to address the “whiteness” in the G/WPS agenda.[79]

(3) Global governance dominated by global north perspectives
The same is true for international cooperation and global governance. Far too often, institutions at that level, maybe unintentionally, reproduce an asymmetric global north-south divide and corresponding inequalities based on colonial patterns. UN decision-making and the permanent veto powers in the UN security council might be the most obvious case.[80] However, these effects trickle down to organisation-wide effects: Many Western countries are heavily overrepresented in UN senior positions, providing more employees per capita than most other countries.[81] The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) illustrates this disproportionate representation with 54% of UN posts at humanitarian offices around the globe staffed with Western[82] nationals when the majority of operations are executed in Asia and Africa.[83] The claim ‘Nothing about them, without them’ is not just an empty phrase for those who commit to a so-called idealist vision of foreign policymaking. We need to develop comprehensive conclusions and approaches to peace and security that include everybody’s diverse perspectives.

6.2 BEYOND REPRESENTATION

We need more women in peace and security, but there are more aspects to gender equality. Looking at the numbers alone is not enough to measure the actual impact of women and marginalised individuals in the field. In the following section, we discuss the aspects that are important for the quality of their participation: the position within hierarchical structures, their rights, and the extent to which they are recognised and ensured, the distribution of

resources, and lastly, socio-cultural norms and practices posing additional barriers to fair and equal participation.

6.2.1 A SEAT – BUT AT WHICH TABLE?

An increase in numbers does not automatically translate into more influence, and increasing numbers are not the same as equal access to power.[84] We can observe this also within the #SHEcurity Index, particularly in the area of diplomacy. Simply put: a seat at the table does not guarantee an invitation to informal power circles where decisions are taken.

> Understanding gender equality only as gender parity risks turning its transformative potential into a cosmetic add-on[85]. It is not about 'add women and stir'; it is about changing the underlying system.

To prevent falling short in ambition, it is important to analyse hierarchies and other limiting factors to decision-making processes in addition to an overall headcount. An example is the Syrian Constitutional Committee, established in 2018 as an attempt to move ahead with the development of a new Syrian constitution as part of a political solution to the war in Syria. While the gender ratio of women negotiators in the overall process is at 27.3%, this rate is achieved only through a near gender-equal composition of the civil society delegation, which does not possess agenda-setting powers. Moreover, Syrian women are further marginalised in the so-called small group of the constitutional committee, the actual power centre of negotiations.86 Therefore, monitoring the progress of gender equality in peace and security needs to take a nuanced approach. A complementary focus on policy output, such as peace agreements, through gender and intersectional analyses further emphasises the inclusion of marginalised perspectives.87 Another example highlights the observation that women are often singled out and invited to talk about so-called 'women's issues' instead of being part of discussions on economic or so-called 'hard' security issues. For example, comparing the ratio of women speakers amongst 23 high-level policy conferences, those addressing security policy, e.g., Munich Security Conference (23% in 2017), have a significantly lower ratio of women speakers as conferences addressing broader topics, e.g., World Forum for Democracy (40% in 2017).[88] But numbers are starting to look differently and have slowly increased overall, in case of the Munich Security Conference by 14 percentage points compared to 2012.

6.2.2 RIGHTS – IN LAW AND SOCIAL PRACTICE

Gender equality is an internationally recognised human right, engrained as a founding principle in the Charter of the UN and endorsed by an international framework of human and women's rights commitments.89 Even so, there are still discriminatory laws and practices around the world that inhibit equal participation for women and other marginalised groups. To achieve gender equality and meaningful participation, we must ensure that everybody can fully enjoy their human rights. This also requires addressing discrimination and violence in law and practice.[90] The WPS agenda follows a human rights-based approach and translates this to the sphere of peace and security.[91] Globally, most countries are party to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), for example, but the U.S. and Palau have not yet ratified the convention, Iran, Somalia, and Sudan have not even signed the agreement.[92] Looking at CEDAW's Optional Protocol, providing a complaint and accountability mechanism, even fewer countries commit. Only 114 parties have signed and ratified the treaty, with 11 countries not yet signed and 72 countries not taken any action in that direction.[93] Additionally, signing and ratifying a treaty or instrument is not the same as compliance.

What is more, there is an increasing backslide on international women's rights and gender equality norms. The Council of Europe Convention on Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, the so-called Istanbul Convention, is a prominent example of being openly contested globally.[94] Turkey's decision to withdraw from the Convention in March this year, at a time of sharp increase in GBV fuelled by the COVID-19 pandemic, has been severely criticised.[95]

At the national level, there are many dimensions to exemplify the discrimination of political or social rights of women or marginalised individuals in law and practice. Women have, on average, three-quarters of the rights of men.[96] According to a recent World Bank report, there are still 75 economies where men and women do not have equal rights to manage and inherit property.[97]

This hinders economic independence and gender equality at many levels. One of the effects is that women, on a global scale, own less than 20% of the world's land resources.[98] Not only does this affect their access to livelihoods and economic development, but it impacts societal status and access to other resources and power – within families, communities, and countries.[99] Women comprise 43% of the global agricultural labour force puts a sharp contrast to this number.[100]

Another dire example is legal protection against violence. Gender-based violence (GBV) is not only an issue in settings of conflict and instability. The urgency of addressing GBV as a fundamental security concern for women worldwide has increased further with the sharp rise in domestic violence during the COVID-19 pandemic.[101] A strikingly large number of countries around the globe do not offer adequate penalties and protection under domestic violence law.



Data: WomenStats Project, https://www.womanstats.org/substatics/DV-SCALE-4-2020.png

Unless we address discriminatory rights and social practices that violate the rights of women and other marginalised groups, limiting access to resources, societal status and power, we will not change

inequalities deeply engrained in societies. Moreover, research shows that countries that continue discriminatory and oppressive patterns against women are more likely to be unstable and exert violence at the domestic and international levels.[102] Violence against women and girls has the same root causes as violence experienced by other marginalised groups, such as LGBTQI+ and PoC, so we must consider the intersecting effects of discrimination. There is no other option to ensure a foreign policy that equally enables the full enjoyment of rights and freedoms for all people.

6.2.3 RESOURCES

In addition to the protection of women's rights, it is equally important that we put our money where our mouth is.

> Ensuring that women and marginalised individuals have the resources, tools and information required to influence political decision-making is crucial to progress toward more gender equality and diversity in peace and security.

Changing political priorities accordingly has to be backed by reallocation of resources to have an actual impact on the realities of women, girls, and marginalised individuals.

It is key to question our priorities and reflect on how much resources we allocate to each policy issue. Looking at both the commitments made by countries and international / supra-national organisations towards their financing of the WPS agenda and the ratio of bilateral official development assistance (ODA) of OECD countries attributed to gender illustrates the status quo.

Even though financing for the WPS agenda's implementation has somewhat increased, systematic underfunding remains a key challenge.[103] NAPs outline a country's approach on how to implement gender equality in peace and security. But they mostly fail to set out strategic goals for gender-aware programming and lack a specific budget earmarked for implementation.[104] Only 36% of WPS NAPs outline such a specific budget and 86% of OSCE member states' NAPs include none or only minimal specifications on budgets and financing instruments.[105] Additionally, looking at the percentage of ODA that is actually spent promoting gender

equality and women's empowerment helps to gain a clearer picture. The member states of the OECD Development Assistance Committee have allocated on average 38% of their bilateral allocable aid on gender equality projects in 2016-2017, in absolute numbers a total of 44,83 million USD.

> Therefore, only 4,63 million USD, which means approximately 3,9 % of the total budget, had gender equality as a principal target.[106]

Making it more concrete: a recent report by UN Women looking at post-conflict financing in Colombia, Iraq, and the Philippines shows that less than 2% of ODA in these cases has been allocated to promote gender equality and women's empowerment. This sharply contrasts the UN target suggesting 15%. Strikingly, the same report identifies the trend that an overall increase in ODA does not lead to more assistance allocated to gender equality.[107] These examples suggest that budgets specifically dedicated to gender equality are as important as continuous monitoring of the actual spending.

Another example is the global humanitarian response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The international community identified the sharp increase in GBV as a key threat faced by women in the pandemic early in 2020.[108] However, only 0,48% of the overall funding appeal of the Global Humanitarian Response Plan was allocated for GBV prevention, risk mitigation and response by August 2020.[109]

Overall, organisations working on gender aspects and/or women rights remain underfunded, restricted in their ability to access funding, continue, implement or expand their work.[110] A 2017 study by the OECD shows that women's groups in fragile contexts are funded only to a very limited extent. The study attributes this to an incomplete – or lacking – understanding of the role of gender equality in conflict and fragility.[111] Civil society actors have been a driving force for gender equality in peace and security, often filling a void left by the international community. Their lack of funding puts the goal to achieve gender equality at the global level at further risk.

Further to specific funding towards gender equality and respective civil society actors, gender perspectives have to be comprehensively intertwined in all areas of programming and policy-making, for example, applying gender analyses in programming. Otherwise, gender budgets might be applied tokenistic and other areas of programming disregarded. To systematically change the funding gap, we need strategic and ambitious goals, transparent monitoring, evaluation and concrete accountability – in addition to more and substantial political will to do so.

6.2.4 SOCIO-CULTURAL BARRIERS

The same gender inequalities that shape our societies perpetuate in international peace and security. All members of society internalise gender norms as part of their socialisation. However, the learning of unequal gender norms may lead to gender stereotypes and perpetuate unequal power relations. Socio-cultural barriers impeding women's political participation are therefore as old as those stereotypes. The #SHEcurity Index quantifies the representation of women in a sphere that is both highly public and representative. Politics, as a public sphere, continues to be stereotypically associated as a male field of action. This renders any woman or individual not perceived as male by a given society into an intruder transgressing societal norms.[112] Those who dare to break these patterns are often met with open hostility, making the price to choose a public profession ultimately higher. In its extreme form, the consequences are gender-based violence, harassment, or even femicide. As the incumbent Luxemburg Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn rightfully put it in the context of diplomacy, when outlining his ideas for a more gender-inclusive diplomatic corps: "This is a cultural revolution in a field, diplomacy, where women have long been marginalised and where the term 'ambassadrice' (female for ambassador) traditionally referred to the ambassador's wife."[113]

Unequal distribution of care work puts an additional burden on women's participation, also in peace and security.[114] Even young people in the G7 countries are less likely to see women as suitable as men in leadership positions, which breaks with the idea that mindsets might automatically change over time.[115] Such gendered hierarchies and patterns existing inside societies are being reflected onto the national and international level and mir-

rored within institutions and organisations of foreign and security policy.[116]

Military institutions, for example, are largely based on concepts of masculinities that present men as those protecting and women as those protected. The roles available for women when joining these institutions are confined to a narrowly pre-shaped space.[117] Consequently, adding more women to negotiation tables or military missions will not automatically lead to the change we need to see.[118] Firstly, we need to link domestic policies with progress toward gender equality in foreign and security policy. Many WPS NAPs, for example, focus largely on external policies and neglect introspection.[119] Addressing issues such as unpaid care work and the need for a societal rethinking of gender norms in NAPs is still too rare.[120] Looking, for example, at the German ministry of foreign affairs in comparison to other supreme federal agencies, its share of women in leadership positions is the lowest with 23% corresponding to a very low share of women in part-time work, even far below average.[121] Secondly, we need to move beyond the stereotypical assignation of roles towards ‘women’ where individuals identified as ‘women’ are regarded as one homogenous group. This negates their diverse identities and experiences. It contributes to gender equality being added as an afterthought instead of integrated throughout all levels and dimensions of programme planning, policy formulation, and decision-making.[122] [123]

Lastly, the backlash against gender equality, women’s and human rights have become an increasing barrier for gender-equal participation, also in peace and security. Violence – physical and online – targeting women in politics is increasing.[124] As a very dire consequence, this further increases the barrier for women to access political positions. It hinders them in the execution of their roles and ultimately poses a threat to democracy. We are sliding back from a situation that never was ideal in the first place. As the data of the Index shows, we have not yet come to see a world that has reached full gender equality. This is all the more a reason to continue the work on the #SHEcurity Index, which strives to achieve equal representation and participation of women at all levels and in all institutions of peace and security.

4 CONCLUSION
IT'S TIME TO BE REALISTIC

Gender equality is at the core of peace and security. However, the 2021 #SHEcurity Index points out that we are far from achieving gender equality anytime soon. We have to start taking the gender representation gap seriously, or we will ultimately fail to build and strengthen peace, security, and development. This is no question of ideology but instead of taking diverse realities into account.[125] At a time when we are not only lagging behind our ambitions as an international community but also sliding back from progress already achieved, decisive action is all the more critical.[126] Based on this year's Index, we suggest two key aspects to progress:

First, **implementing gender equality in foreign policy starts at home.** The priority of all countries committed to this goal should be to abolish discriminatory norms, legislation, and social practices that create barriers for women and marginalised individuals to participate equally at all levels of foreign and security policy. (Foreign) policymaking needs to include diverse perspectives and apply an intersectional approach in language as well as in programming. Looking into the #SHEcurity data, almost all countries have reason to critically assess their policies and progress on equality and diversity in foreign policy – starting within their own ranks. This requires a stronger inward focus in most countries' WPS NAPs. By definition, they serve as a platform to define, monitor and strengthen the implementation of the WPS agenda at the national level. Countries, therefore, need to transform them into valuable tools, rising to the challenge to close the gender gap in peace and security. And in addition to the many instruments already in place, we now need the political will to truly implement them. Moreover, countries need to address the obvious gap in documentation and render themselves accountable, starting with gathering, monitoring and evaluating data at the national level and committing to a coherent and transparent documentation scheme at the international level. The #SHEcurity Index contributes to this effort, and we will continue to refine and expand its database. Doing so, we also rely on your cooperation and kindly ask you to approach the #SHEcurity team if you know or have access to additional data. This way, we can continue to build an ever more comprehensive data set together for our mutual benefit.

The #SHEcurity Index analyses the progress of women's participation in peace and security, focusing on their representation in governmental structures. But there is a significant complementary aspect we mention only briefly because of this focus of analysis: As a second issue, **we have to look beyond states and strengthen civil society at home and abroad.** Civil society organisations have not only been a key force moving norm development of the WPS agenda forward.[127] They have also been contributing to expanding the agenda, raising issues such as diversity and accountability of different marginalised perspectives.[128] Civil society organisations provide additional channels for women and marginalised individuals to participate in policymaking if they are otherwise excluded from formal processes. Foreign policy needs to be more than people with badges talking to other people with badges.[129] We have to look at foreign policy differently to reflect the diversity of experiences. This is especially true pursuing an intersectional approach and bridging interconnected aspects raised in the #SHEcurity+ chapters. There is a strong need for bridge-building between allies working toward gender equality to strengthen and lift each other up. We have to ensure space for civil society in all parts of (foreign) policymaking – and facilitate access to the necessary resources – capacities, economic means, and information – to do so.

Lastly, the #SHEcurity Index intends to spark the discourse on gender equality in peace and security. There are many more aspects that we could have addressed in the Index, and especially, there are many more questions to examine using the database. Do conflict and crisis settings have a visible effect on women's representation? Is there a correlation between marginalised women's representation and other forms of gender inequality, such as discrimination against LGBTQI+ individuals? How are women and people of colour represented in the best and worst examples? We encourage our readers to use the #SHEcurity Index as a tool and hope to encourage a lively debate to achieve actual progress. We will certainly continue to expand and refine the index for its 2022 version.

8 ACRONYMS

· BLM	Black Lives Matter
· CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
· CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
· EEAS	European External Action Service
· EU	European Union
· EUSREU	Special Representatives
· GBV	Gender-based violence
· GMF	German Marshall Fund
· HRD	Human rights defender
· LGBTQI+*	Lesbian, Gay, Bi, Trans, Queer, and Intersex
· MFA staff	Foreign affairs ministry staff
· NAP	National action plan
· OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
· ODA	Official development assistance
· PoC	People of colour
· SGBV	Sexual and gender-based violence
· UAE	United Arab Emirates
· UN	United Nations
· UNSCR	UN Security Council Resolution
· WAB	Syrian Women's Advisory Board (WAB) to the UN Special Envoy
· WIIS	Women in International Security
· WoC	Women of colour
· WPS	Women, Peace and Security

* According to our partner Outright International: „Adding a "+" to the acronym is an acknowledgment that there are non-cisgender and non-straight identities that are not included in the acronym. This is a shorthand or umbrella term for all people who have a non-normative gender identity or sexual orientation." Available from: https://outrightinternational.org/content/acronyms-explained [Accessed 18 October 2021]

9 NOTES

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